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Abstract:
Advocates of dialogic communication have promoted two-way
symmetrical communication as the most effective and ethical model for public
relations. This article uses John Durham Peters’s critique of dialogic
communication to reconsider this infatuation with dialogue. In this article, we
argue that dialogue’s potential for selectivity and tyranny poses moral
problems for public relations. Dialogue’s emphasis on reciprocal
communication also saddles public relations with ethically questionable quid
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pro quo relationships. We contend that dissemination can be more just than
dialogue because it demands more integrity of the source and recognizes the
freedom and individuality of the source. The type of communication, such as
dialogue or dissemination, is less important than the mutual discovery of
truth. Reconciliation, a new model of public relations, is proposed as an
alternative to pure dialogue. Reconciliation recognizes and values individuality
and differences, and integrity is no longer sacrificed at the altar of agreement.

Communication: Both “Bridge and Chasm”
When WellPoint, a California-based holding company, acquired
Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Georgia, it soon learned that the two
companies were as far apart culturally as they were geographically.
The buyer’s communications team discovered that Blue Cross had
never undergone reorganization while WellPoint reorganized on a
regular basis. “I didn’t get the cultural issue until I was there,” said
Ken Ferber, WellPoint’s vice president of communications. “I came
back to my boss and said, ‘We’re not ready’” (Communicating
Corporate Change, 2001, p. 1).
Typical public relations strategy called for Ferber to initiate a
“two-way concept” of public relations that “emphasizes communication
exchange, reciprocity, and mutual understanding” (Cutlip, Center, &
Broom, 2000, p. 4). Using two-way communication, Wellpoint and Blue
Cross could adjust and adapt to each other until they reached a
consensus or an agreement on a common culture. This approach is
rooted in open systems theory and is best known in public relations
literature as the two-way symmetrical model of public relations
(Grunig & Hunt, 1984). The two-way symmetrical model is considered
the most ethical (Grunig, 1989; Pearson, 1989) because one-way
“public relations relies almost entirely on propaganda and persuasive
communication” (Cutlip et al., 2000, p. 3). However, how realistic is it
for two companies with distinct corporate cultures to achieve a
symmetrical relationship, especially when a big company acquires a
smaller one? The merger’s success may depend on the two companies
recognizing their differences rather than seeking agreement on a
common culture. Recognizing differences takes into consideration
human nature, that people may associate with a particular company
because its culture fits their personalities. As philosopher William
James (1890/1952) said, each person may divide the universe into
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two separate halves and associate with one or the other but no matter
which one a person chooses, each draws a dividing line in a different
place:
The altogether unique kind of interest each human mind feels in
those parts of creation which it can call me or mine may be a
moral riddle, but it is a fundamental psychological fact. … Each
of us dichotomizes the Kosmos in a different place. (as cited
Peters, 1999, p. 4)
Individual distinctions, let alone group differences, make the
symmetry of dialogic communication an elusive goal. Although many
communication theorists would like to believe that true communication
means reaching agreement or achieving an understanding, the reality
is that communication is both a “bridge and chasm,” bringing people
closer to agreement and exposing the disagreement lying in between
(Peters, 1999, p. 5). Peters defined communication as the project of
reconciling self and other. To think it might do more may be a recipe
for failure.
Peters (1999) defended his contentions in his book Speaking
Into the Air: A History of the Idea of Communication. Although Peters
did not address public relations in his book, he did raise important
questions about whether dialogue is always the best approach to
communication. Indeed, Peters’s work has the potential of liberating
public relations from an unhealthy infatuation with dialogue and its
antecedents, such as symmetrical and reciprocal communication. This
is not to say that dialogue is always bad or that it can never be ethical.
On the contrary, Peters saw dialogue as lofty goal for communication;
he just worried that it “may blind us to the more subtle splendors of
dissemination or suspended dialogue” (p. 62). There is value in
nonreciprocal forms of communication.
In this article, we attempt to apply Peters’s (1999) critique of
dialogue to public relations. We question the basic assumptions of
dialogic public relations by examining the philosophical roots of
dialogue and two-way symmetric communication. This deconstruction
of dialogue exposes moral cracks and contradictions in the concept and
its application to public relations.
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Second, in this article we show how dialogue’s emphasis on
reciprocal communication saddles public relations with ethically
questionable quid pro quo relationships. Third, a look at Peters’s
analysis of dissemination shows that contrary to dialogue,
dissemination can enhance freedom, responsibility, diversity, and
reconciliation. Finally, we introduce reconciliation as a new model of
ethical public relations that recognizes the strengths and limitations of
dialogue and dissemination.

Dialogue in Public Relations
In recent years, the business world has embraced dialogue as
the role model for effective, ethical communication.
In certain quarters dialogue has attained something of a holy
status. It is held up as the summit of human encounter, the
essence of liberal education, and the medium of participatory
democracy. By virtue of its reciprocity and interaction, dialogue
is taken as superior to the one-way communiqués of mass
media and mass culture. (Peters, 1999, p. 33)
Public relations research and theory is no exception to this rule.
If one accepts the conclusions of post-modern rhetorical
theory—that communication processes play a fundamental role
in the generation of both scientific and moral truth—then ethical
business conduct is conduct that is sanctioned within the
parameters of a dialogic communication process … No other
source of ethical standards exists. Conduct that is not
sanctioned or legitimized by that process is open to attack on
moral grounds. (Pearson, 1989, p. 127)
The argument that dialogue should become the central focus for
business ethics has become a common theme for public relations
scholars. In their groundbreaking work, Grunig and Hunt (1984)
identified four models of public relations: press agentry or publicity,
public information, two-way asymmetrical, and two-way symmetrical.
Grunig (1989) praised two-way symmetrical as the most “excellent” of
the models and labeled press agentry or publicity as “propagandistic
public relations,” public information as “journalists-in-residence”
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dissemination absent of any negative information, and two-way
asymmetrical communication as manipulating publics to accomplish
organizational goals (p. 29).
In subsequent research, Grunig (1989) touted the two-way
symmetrical model as the most ethical, arguing that its ethical
rationale came from the Habermas (1984) ideal speech situation
(Grunig & Grunig, 1992; Pearson 1989). The ideal speech situation
emphasizes symmetry and reciprocity, conditions that mirror the twoway symmetrical model (Leeper, 1996). Like Habermas, Grunig
defined communication as a process that leads to mutual
understanding. “The major purpose of communication is to facilitate
understanding among people and such other systems as organizations,
publics, or societies,” Grunig wrote. “Persuasion of one person by
another is less desirable” (Grunig, 1989, p. 38). In 2001, Grunig
moderated his views to some extent, contending that the symmetrical
model was “inherently ethical,” whereas the other models were ethical,
“depending on the rules used to ensure ethical practice” (p. 29).
Despite Grunig’s (1989) attempts to clarify his views, the model
became the target of criticism by scholars. Pieczka (1997) claimed the
two-way symmetrical model is utopian, whereas Van der Meiden
(1993) argued that such communication is unrealistic for organizations
because it requires them to give up goals and objectives vital for
survival in the business world. Others said Grunig’s model fails to
consider how organizations use a combination of the four models in
public relations (Leichty & Springston, 1993). Susskind and Field
(1996) noted the difficulty of using the two-way symmetrical model in
times of conflict: “In value-laden debates, to compromise or to
accommodate neither advances one’s self-interest nor increases joint
gain” (p. 155).
Cancel, Mitrook, and Cameron (1999) wondered how an
organization would deal with morally repugnant publics, especially in
situations in which the organization starts from a position based on
morally defensible deontological principles. The authors also
questioned whether accommodation is logically possible when adapting
to one public is done at the expense of another. They proposed a
contingency theory of accommodation that attempts to balance
intended effects between the client and the public interest. Their
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theory offers a possible alternative to dialogue, but in the end it still
emphasizes the importance of dialogue over dissemination.
For others, “dialogue is not a panacea. A dialogic approach
cannot force an organization to behave ethically, nor is it even
appropriate in some circumstances” (Kent & Taylor, 2002, p. 24). The
term dialogue, Kent and Taylor added, is used ubiquitously and with
little specificity. What is understandable is dialogue’s appeal to public
relations. In a profession beset by criticism for spinning the truth to
portray bad news as good and good news as better than it is, public
relations embraced dialogue’s emphasis on equality, agreement, and
mutual benefit. However, Peters’s (1999) historical analysis showed
that dialogue is not always the balanced, fair approach that it appears
to be. Peters argued that “dialogue can be tyrannical and
dissemination can be just”(p. 34).

The Debate: Dialogue Versus Dissemination
In support of his argument, Peters (1999) staged a debate
between Socrates, dialogue’s greatest proponent, and Jesus, the
world’s “most enduring voice for dissemination” (p. 35). The Phaedrus,
Peters claimed, reflects an anxiety over technology’s effects on human
interaction. For Socrates, the technology was writing, but it could
easily represent the concerns for the dispersion of information across
radio, television, and the Internet. Socrates saw true communication
as a “matching of minds,” a “coupling of desires.” In face-to-face
speech two people share an event intended for only each other, but
“writing allows all manner of strange couplings: the distant influence
the near, the dead speak to the living, and the many read what was
intended for the few” (Peters, 1999, p. 37).
Peters (1999) described Socrates’s vision of communication as a
reciprocal love without penetration, a love of wisdom pursued with
another human. This is the love of the noble lover who fixes “his
attention upon the intelligible and the divine,” conceiving “an exalted
attitude toward the beloved” (Weaver, 1985, p. 13). In the Phaedrus,
Socrates called this type of communication a “blessed life and a life of
one mind … , being masters of themselves and orderly, enslaved in
regard to that by which the soul’s badness was arising within, freed in
regard to that by which virtue was arising” (Plato, 1998, p. 61 [256a–
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256b]). Genuine love and friendship emerges from this symmetrical
relationship. “Socrates treats interpersonal communication as not only
a happy mode of message exchange but, at its finest, the mutual
salvation of souls in each other’s love beneath the blessings of
heaven” (Peters, 1999, p. 45). This ideal of communication is
“glorious” in its romantic notion of the melding of souls and “severe” in
its unrealistic expectations for successful communication (Peters,
1999, p. 45). Peters echoes concerns of many public relations scholars
who believe symmetrical communication is an unattainable normative
theory for the practice of public relations.
For Socrates, true love is not dispersed indiscriminately but only
shared with a deserving soul who is willing to reciprocate. The effect of
this type of communication, whether between lovers in dialogue or the
“reciprocal coupling” between speaker and audience in rhetoric, is a
“closed communication circuit” (Peters, 1999, p. 46). Instead of
promoting the open communication valued by public relations,
dialogue emphasizes limited participation in the process and
heightened control over the interchange.
Writing may provide more participation and freedom, but its
“dispersive properties” allow it to fall into any hands, producing
progeny (interpretations) much different than that intended by the
message’s parent. To expand on the Socratic analogy, the writer’s
promiscuity could lead to the creation of many illegitimate children
who may look like the original but grow to maturity under the
influence of strangers. “For Socrates,” wrote Peters (1999), “as for
many thinkers since, dialogue (fertile coupling) is the norm;
dissemination (spilled seed) is the deviation” (p. 49). In writing, as in
broadcasting, personal contact is replaced by the illusion of presence.
There is no chance for interaction and mutual understanding. The
receiver is left to his or her own devices to interpret the soul of the
sender.
Socrates’s vision of communication, again, is not simply about
media—the goodness of speech versus the badness of writing—
but about the symmetry and tightness of the relationships in
which they are embedded. For Plato’s Socrates, the medium is
not a mere channel but a whole series of relationships. The
critique of writing on papyrus as opposed to writing on souls
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maintains the deeper theme of dialogue: two are needed for
love or wisdom. (Peters, 1999, pp. 49–50, italics added).
Socrates wanted mutual discovery, understanding, and
agreement, but its reliance on reciprocity threatens to reduce society
to quid pro quo relationships. “Social life,” Peters (1999) contended,
“would be a cycle of payment, rather than gifts” (p. 56). Dialogue also
emphasizes selectivity and controlled interpersonal communication,
both which can lead to tyranny, seduction, pandering, and missed
connections.
As an alternative to dialogue, Peters (1999) offered the synoptic
Gospels’ celebration of dissemination. In the parable of the sower,
Jesus talks about uniformly broadcasting seeds across various types of
soil. The harvest is varied depending upon the receptiveness of the
receivers. The responsibility for interpreting the message is left to the
receiver, who has the autonomy to assign a meaning different from
that intended by the sender. Peters suggested that the gap between
encoding the message and the audience’s decoding of the message
“may well be the mark of all forms of communication” (p. 52). The
gaps only become obvious with the introduction of a new medium,
such as the Internet, which produced outcomes far removed from
those intended by its creators.
Contrary to dialogue, the dissemination of the synoptic Gospels
values asymmetric relationships and public distribution. The sender
ignores individual differences or the possibility of reciprocity. One is
expected to treat other people as one would want to be treated
regardless of consequences or merit. The father receives the prodigal
son with open arms and generosity despite the son’s moral and
monetary transgressions. Distribution ignores merit and treats all
receivers justly and without bias. “There is something both democratic
and frightening about such apparent indifference to merit” (Peters,
1999, p. 54). Furthermore, it is better to give than receive. Instead of
imposing obligation, giving blesses the lives of the receivers for their
“unprovoked generosity (one-way)” (p. 58). Reciprocity can rob people
of individuality and uniqueness, taking away the qualities that form the
basis of love. It also can be unjust because it can theoretically limit
universal access to communication interactions and processes.
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Clearly there is nothing ethically deficient about broadcasting as
a one-way flow. Nor are the gaps between sender and receiver
always chasms to be bridged; they are sometimes vistas to be
appreciated or distances to be respected. The impossibility of
connection, so lamented of late, may be a central and salutary
feature of the human lot. The dream of communication has too
little respect for personal inaccessibility. (Peters, 1999, p. 59)
The final difference between Socrates and Christ may have the
most profound implications for public relations. It also calls into
question the very foundation of the argument for two-way symmetrical
as being morally superior to one-way dissemination. Platonic love is
attracted to beauty. It must be impersonal and general to qualify as
love. Socrates sees no value in love of the particular. Christian love, on
the other hand, embraces the differences of others, especially those
with needs and imperfections. Indeed, one could argue that Christian
love exalts diversity, seeing each person as unique and valuable, while
Platonic love values the uniting of two souls into a universal oneness
that marginalizes individuality. Peters (1999) argued that
dissemination as a model for communication better represents the
reality of the human agent, unique, different, and imperfect.
“Dissemination is not wreckage; it is our lot” (p. 62).
Dialogue’s disgust for the distinct presents public relations with
an intriguing paradox. To fulfill Socrates’s expectations for dialogue, an
organization would select only publics with which it could successfully
communicate. Only those most likely to agree with the organization’s
position would be worthy of love or of a relationship. If the two parties
could not reach mutual understanding, the effort would be considered
a fruitless waste of energy and love. Thus, for dialogue to truly occur,
the organization would select like-minded publics, those judged most
likely to reach an agreement with the organization. However, this
focus on only those publics possessing the capability to reciprocate and
accommodate to the organization’s position would directly conflict with
the basic assumptions of open systems theory, which calls for
adjusting and adapting to changes in the environment (Bivins, 1992).
In other words, the demands of dialogue force the organization to
become more strategic and selective in its communication and more
reliant on homogenous publics to achieve mutual understanding. The
use of selective communication designed to persuade like-minded
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publics transforms dialogue into two-way asymmetric communication,
which is based on controlling the environment rather than adjusting
and adapting to it. In his critique of writing, Socrates complained that
written words reach out to “those who understand as in the same way
by those for whom it is in now way fitting….” Without support of the
“father” of the words, written words cannot defend against faultfinding and unfair attacks (Plato, 1998, p. 86 [p. 275d–e]; see also
Peters, 1999, p. 47). In other words, the sender’s motivation for
entering into dialogue is not necessarily to hear what the receiver has
to say but to make sure the sender’s words reach the right people and
are understood in the right way.
In early 2005, President George Bush visited cities across the
country promoting an overhaul of the social security system. In public
meetings, he conversed with “ordinary” people, many of whom were
“handpicked to dramatize his points, in front of crowds of supporters”
(Kosterlitz, 2005, p. 854). At a town-hall style event in Florida, one of
the “regular folks” said he liked the President’s plan to allow people to
invest Social Security money in the stock market because it would
produce higher returns. The President readily agreed with the man’s
opinion because it was the same as his own. The man turned out to be
an activist for a conservative group. At another event aimed at testing
public opinion in New Jersey, White House staffers held a dress
rehearsal for participants the day before the event. The Democrats
also staged town-hall events feature their own activists as “regular
folks” (Bailey, Wolffe, &Lipper, 2005,pp.34–35). These examples show
how the burden of reaching understanding and consensus has
ultimately led to inequity in the environment and exclusion from the
dialogue.

Dialogue and Systems Theory
The use of systems theory as a foundation for public relations
also becomes problematic from the ethical standpoint. Cutlip et al.
(2000) defined a system as a set of interdependent units or parts that
adjusts and adapts to external (and likely internal) pressures to
maintain its goal states (existence). Public relations helps to maintain
symmetry between the organization and its publics. With external
pressures driving change and adaptation, dialogue’s bias toward
relationships most likely to lead to agreement becomes even more
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morally questionable in systems symmetry. In systems theory,
stakeholders increase in importance to public relations because of their
instrumental value to the organization rather than their intrinsic value
as human beings. Bivins (1992) suggested that an organization or
system weigh the interests of stakeholders based on their claims on
the organization (p. 373). Only those stakeholders considered valuable
to the organization’s success or possessing the most valid claims might
be considered worthy of dialogue, and the dialogue is limited to the
extent necessary to bring about agreement and adjustment. An
organization could then justify the selective use of dialogue, the
strategic selection of publics, and the strategic use communication to
reach agreement. This could lead to the creation of a communication
caste system for external publics and internal publics. Those
employees seen as less instrumental to the success of the organization
would then become less worthy of dialogic communication. Bivins
(2004) has since modified his position, contending that organizations
have the greatest moral obligation to those “linkages” or stakeholders
most affected by organizational decisions, particularly those
constituents most vulnerable to organizational actions.
Where before ethical decisions were contingent on system
inputs (Bivins, 1992, p. 375), now ethical decisions would emphasize
system outputs. Individuals are valued as means to achieving
corporation ends. Furthermore, the organization’s moral obligations
arise from factors external to the organization rather than on the
moral character of the system itself. The irony of ethical
communication based on systems theory and dialogue is that its very
emphasis on equality, consensus, and agreement could promote
inequity in the selection of publics (even those considered most
vulnerable), a false consensus arising from the selection criteria, and
disparate treatment of publics based on their instrumental or even
noninstrumental value to the organization.
These ironies also are present the two-way symmetrical model.
Grunig and Hunt (1984) contended that two-way symmetrical
communication would make organizations more responsible to their
publics. However, theoretically, the two-way symmetrical model
reduces the responsibility of the organization and the public in
determining right action. The very act of negotiating right relieves
each party of some of its responsibility to be right. One’s morals
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become fluid, flowing through channels offering the least resistance or
the most opportunity. Symmetry means that an organization or public
can shift part of the responsibility for determining right action to the
other party. Thus, instead of increasing an organization’s burden for
right action, symmetry may reduce expectations and encourage
adapting for the sake of reaching an agreement acceptable to both
parties. Cancel et al. (1999) noted that taking a moral stand on some
issues may demand placing principle above process in communicating.
They argued that practitioners shift between advocacy and
accommodation depending upon a variety of variables, such as
corporate culture, size of the organization, individual characteristics,
and public relations access to the dominant coalition. However, this
contingency approach, like symmetry, also smacks of ethical
relativism. Instead of abdicating moral responsibility to reach an
external agreement, the practitioner adjusts moral behaviors to fit
external conditions or variables. One might make moral stands but
only if the conditions call for them.
Dialogue also requires equality among parties and the sharing of
information. However, even the most sincere corporation might find it
difficult to create a situation of equality in communicating with its
various stakeholders. The corporation employs professional
communicators valued for expertise far superior to that possessed by
civic groups, smaller organizations, and even the government. Activist
groups often lack the funding necessary to match wits with corporate
public relations personnel. Equality also becomes a factor in
considering the sharing of information. In theory, one would be
completely open in dialogic relationships, reciprocating with each
communicative action, and eventually having all information in
common. However, most organizations have access to far greater
resources in information and technology, giving them an advantage in
the relationship. If the goal of the discourse is agreement, either party
might hold back information that might discourage consensus or might
use its resources to supply information that encourage consensus. The
outcome would be a false consensus reached through covert deception
or overt coercion. When the U.S. Department of Education paid
syndicated columnist and TV personality Armstrong Williams to
promote the No Child Left Behind Act, it used its financial resources to
guarantee that Armstrong understood and agreed with the message.
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He reciprocated by repeating the message as if it were his own opinion
(Friel, 2005). Truth was negotiated, and symmetry was achieved.
Dialogue also threatens to become a paternalistic approach to
communication. The elite father serves as a mentor to a noble disciple
carefully selected for his beauty and receptive spirit. An organization
could selectively choose only those stakeholders who could reciprocate
through an economic and emotional attachment. Dialogue could easily
degenerate to a quid pro quo relationship with those whose gifts would
best benefit the bottom line. This would mean entering into dialogue
with people with the means to give something back. This type of
relationship places a high priority on strategic selection, strategic
communication, and strategic adaptation. Thus, the very antitheses of
dialogue—persuasive and strategic communication—could become a
natural outgrowth of the dialogic relationship. To resolve this conflict,
a necessary step is to shift the moral emphasis of public relations from
establishing relationships to adopting universal community principles
(Arnett, 1986, p. 97). Common principles and values should precede
and take precedence over relationships.
These are admittedly extreme cases. Plenty of anecdotal
evidence exists in the public relations literature to support the benefits
of two-way symmetrical communication. While still advocating the
two-way symmetrical model as the most effective for public relations,
Grunig and Grunig (1992) noted calls for a continuum between twoway asymmetrical and symmetrical communication and agreed that
professional practice encompasses aspects of both models. However,
they again questioned the moral validity of dissemination models of
public relations, categorizing them under the umbrella of craft public
relations. The problem with this kind of dichotomy is that it fails to
consider the possibility of two parties reconciling their differences
without resorting to persuasion or dialogue. Indeed, the gaps between
two parties may serve as the foundation for professional relationships
in which distance protects against personal and public deception.
Take for instance, the proverbial relationship between public
relations practitioners and journalists. Journalists often rely on public
relations practitioners for newsworthy information and sources. Public
relations practitioners count on journalists for media coverage and
third party endorsements. The two have complementary but distinct
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objectives. However, the recognition of these differences allows each
party to determine its interdependence with the other without turning
to manipulation. Ironically, the potential for manipulation (or
corrupting media channels) increases in a dialogic relationship based
on reciprocity and mutual benefit. Public relations practitioners would
offer journalists first dibs on a big story in return for favorable
treatment and good play on the story. At the other end of a continuum
between dialogue and dissemination, journalists would make editorial
decisions about a disseminated press release or pitch solely on the
merits of its news content and value to the publication’s readers.
In excluding dissent in favor of agreeable supporters, President
Bush’s efforts to reform Social Security may have violated the
differences, the gaps expected to exist between the government and
the governed. A majority of the public may not have embraced his
reforms because his campaign focused on managed agreement rather
than reconciled differences. In contrast, dissemination allows for
publics to decide how they want to manage their own relationships
with the organization. Just because a company disseminates
information without any framework or expectation of public response
does not mean that the company will ignore responses. Absence of
immediate feedback puts more responsibility on the organization to
communicate accurately and effectively in the first place. Peters
(1999) argued that a “receiver-oriented model in which the sender has
no control over the harvest” (p. 35) demands that messages be as
clear as possible so meaning is not lost in the interpretation. “It
becomes the hearer’s responsibility to close the loop without the aid of
the speaker” (Peters, 1999, p. 52). A company committed to character
and community does not wait for a public response to correct
inconsistencies in its communication and behavior. This does not mean
that agreement and feedback are not important; it means that it
should not be the ultimate concern. Of greater concern is one’s regard
for self, the other person, and community.
The act of becoming communities implies a process in which
community members engage in an ongoing process of interpretation
(Royce, 1988; Trotter, 2001), not necessarily dialogue. Community
members can interpret public reaction because they share the values
and loyalties of the community. One’s interpretations of those values
and loyalties might be different, but having care and concern for
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community members engenders empathy, an emotional
understanding. Companies hire public relations people because they
speak a different language than that normally spoken in the business
community. Public relations people tend to be more in tune with the
press and the public. They intuitively know when corporate behavior
will spark negative or positive reactions in the court of public opinion.
Their role is not so much to reach an agreement with the disparate
publics but to act as an interpreter between the organization’s
dominant coalition and the people affected by an organization. If the
organization exploits or undermines the community by violating
community values and norms, no amount of dialogue or two-way
communication will bridge the chasm.
Communities emerge from a combination of dialogue,
dissemination, and interpretation. The goal of public relations is not to
promote consensus in a community or even understanding. The goal of
public relations is to identify the distinctive aspects of the community
and understand and appreciate its community values that make it
unique. Kruckeberg and Starck (1988) contended that the goal of
community relations in public relations is to “restore and maintain a
sense of community, which has been lost in contemporary society” (p.
26). American idealist Josiah Royce (1908) attributed the loss of
community to the leveling effect of industrialization. By leveling effect,
Royce meant the loss of identity, either as individuals or as
communities. In modern times, the leveling effect has resulted from
the mainstreaming of culture through the mass media, mass
marketing, and mass technologies. People have lost their sense of
place, family, past, and future. Trotter (2001) explained that Royce’s
communities consisted of common “memories and expectations,” and
community members cooperate in seeking truth. “In the highest
stages of moral life,” Trotter continued, “individuals develop, through
empathy and other powers of social communication, a deeper moral
insight and an ability to interpret the ideals of ever wider cross
sections of humanity” (pp. 83–84). As members of a community,
individuals interpret their own goals and ideals “in terms of an
overarching loyalty to humanity” (p. 84).
Royce’s community of inquiry views communication in much the
same way as the philosopher G. W. F. Hegel, who, according to Peters
(1999), saw communication not as shared information but “as the
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process whereby a free human world is built collectively” (p. 110).
According to Peters, Hegel would not have separated the message
from the channel because communication is embodied in a person’s
subjective interior and in external objects. One gains knowledge of the
world as one comes to understand how particulars make up the whole.
In other words, the building of communities and relationships is a
product of reconciling the mutual recognition of others’ differences, not
only in what they say but how they say it. Hegel (1948) said, “Life is
the union of union and nonunion” (p. 312). “Hence ‘communication’
will always be more than the shuttling of mind-stuff. It is the founding
of a world” (as cited in Peters, 1999, p. 112; see Hegel, 1948). It also
is the stuff out of which relationships develop. Human existence
depends on the recognition of another human being. Public relations
recognizes that activist groups may disagree, employees may not feel
secure in their jobs, neighbors may not want a new plant in their
backyard, and customers may need reassurance that one’s products
are safe. By embracing diversity in opinion, public relations actually
becomes a more human enterprise. “Recognition enables humanity.
Self-consciousness exists only as it is recognized” (as cited in Peters,
1999, p. 115; see Hegel, 1977).
Recognition involves interpretation. Communication becomes
the process of interpreting one’s world and then reconciling the
subjective recognitions with objective meanings and visa versa. Thus,
meanings are both private and public phenomena The communication
intended by a public relations practitioner may only be partially
recognized in a news story written by a journalist. The practitioner
cannot physically express his or her intentions to the reader, but the
reader sees hints of the practitioner’s intentions in the media story.
The multiplicity of interactions between an organization and its
stakeholders makes it impossible to control all possible interpretations
and outcomes. Peters (1999) contended that this interaction is a
model of communication in general. “To live is to leave traces. To
speak to another is to produce signs that are independent of one’s soul
and are interpreted without one’s control” (p. 118).
Thus, an organization’s relationships with its publics are not
understood through the fusing of one person with another (such as
management and stakeholders) but through the establishing of
“conditions under which the mutual recognition of self-conscious
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individuals is possible” (p. 112). This kind of recognition occurs when
the local bank sponsors an evening budgeting class for newlyweds, a
bike manufacturer trains a local Boy Scout troop to assemble and
service their own bikes, and a newspaper sponsors the community
spelling bee.

Recognition Leads to Reconciliation
In a sense, people must overcome differences while at the same
time appreciating the differences in others. Society emerges and
changes from this recognition and reconciliation. It is also possible that
this is at the heart of relationships. The public relations practitioner
recognizes the individuality of a particular public and then reconciles,
not eliminates, those differences in building a relationship. Journalists
may never feel comfortable about working with a public relations
practitioners, but the recognition of their differences leads to the
reconciliation necessary for them to accomplish their disparate goals.
Communication breakdowns are as likely to reveal truth as they
are to suppress it. For public relations this means more might be
learned about a situation by focusing on the problems inhibiting
communication rather than on the express goal of the communication.
All out efforts to reach agreement may lead both parties to suppress
differences rather than recognizing them and reconciling them. This
process exposes a paradox in dialogic communication. The very goal of
agreement and consensus may well cause the parties to overlook and
suppress issues critical to any kind of long-term agreement or
reconciliation. To reach agreement, the two parties might minimize
differences that smolder in the background until circumstances or
social conditions push them to the forefront, forcing the parties back to
the negotiating table to find another artificial agreement to mask the
underlying non-agreement.
Kierkegaard saw communication as “strategic
misunderstanding” (Peters, 1999, p. 129). The responsibility for
interpreting the communication is left to the hearers. The message is
cloaked in irony; it cannot be separated from the mode of
communication. In his writings, Kierkegaard “employed indirect
communication … in order to take himself as author out of the picture
and to leave the reader alone with the ideas” (Hong & Hong, 1983, p.
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x). As with Jesus’s parables, Kierkegaard’s idea of communication is to
pass along messages not readily apparent to everyone but blatantly
obvious to those in the know. In an age of technology, distance, and
speed, dialogue’s ideal mode of communication, face-to-face, is a rare
commodity, and the hearer’s ability to test Habermas’s (1996) validity
claims—truth, rightness, and truthfulness—is nearly impossible (p.
137). Communication is difficult, and failure to achieve understanding
or agreement does not mean that communication did not take place.
Indeed, problems in communication may tell more about individuals
and others than the absence of a communication breakdown. In
relations with others, the particular takes precedence over the general.
Others are valued for their uniqueness, their differences. As we begin
to reconcile those differences, we develop relationships based on love
of the individual and individuality not the possibility of cloning that
person into a common mindset. The emphasis is not on making the
person a part of a crowd but identifying the persons in the crowd as
individuals pursuing a variety of goals and ideals. The purpose of
communication then becomes an effort to not only learn more about
others but to gain a greater understanding of who we are.
Organizations, like other community members, should cherish the
chance to distinguish differences because those very differences clarify
our mission and principles to internal and external audiences. As Mill
(1863/2002) wrote, “He who knows only his side of the case, knows
little of that” (p. 38). Mill contended that hearing another’s arguments
through intermediaries is not sufficient. One must hear from the
people possessing those arguments and willing to passionately defend
them. Unless placed into “the mental position of those who think
differently,” people “cannot know themselves the doctrine which they
themselves profess” (p. 38). Public relations becomes the corporate
conscience, not because they know the organization better than
anybody else, but because they know better than anybody else in the
organization what outsiders think.
Thus the goal of public relations changes from finding
agreement to discovering differences. As differences become
transparent, even those differences between who we think we are and
who others perceive us to be, they can be reconciled in a way that
places a high value on our common humanity. Using this framework,
we engage people or publics in communication, not in an effort to
change them or even to change us, but because as human beings, we
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value our relationships with other human beings. The outcome of this
type of relationship is a different kind of change, one not of adaptation
or adjustment in response to outside pressures, but constitutional
change in who we are and how we perceive ourselves—which then
leads to changes in the way we interact and communicate. Our
external publics are empowered to change themselves based on
internal values and loyalties rather than outside coercion or obligatory
reciprocity.
This new approach to public relations emphasizes reconciliation
through dissemination and engagement. The goal of communication is
to achieve authenticity or what Kierkegaard calls a “persistent striving”
for truth, a striving to become a person who acts without deception
(Kierkegaard, 1971, p. 110, 119–122). The authentic person sacrifices
his or her will to universal moral laws while “constantly striving” to
fulfill moral ideals (Copleston, 1985, p. 348; see also Kierkegaard,
1971). The authentic organization would not settle for an artificial
agreement or a balance between opposing opinions, but seek to find
the truth in opposition and agreement. If the organization harbors
more error than truth, it will feel obligated to rewrite its moral
constitution. Change is internally motivated. Public relations will value
diversity, uniqueness, and pluralism. It will look at stakeholders as
individual human beings, not inhuman publics. It will value equity in
action and purpose over maintaining the equilibrium of the system.
Organizations will achieve authority through their appeal to universal
values and loyalties.
Harvard philosopher Carl Friedrich (1963) provided a model for
this new type of public relations in his description of a constitutional
order. The order consists of people with common interests and beliefs
founded on basic universal principles. The common people have
freedom to act and think for themselves, but their commitment to
basic principles ties them together in the common interests of the
order. Dissent, or might one say difference, is essential because the
“continuous struggle in the marketplace of ideas” helps to maintain the
authority of the order or organization. It is critical for the organization
to continually engage its members through communication. As
organizational members participate in this discourse, they begin to
look upon these communications as their own, “as something they
have taken hold of as much as it has taken hold of them” (pp. 53–54).
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As the two parties exchange communication, the organization
uses its authority to augment and implement the actions of the
stakeholders affected by that authority. As these stakeholders begin to
see the organization as a partner in achieving their own goals as well
as community goals, they become engaged. They do not reach a
consensus on plans of action so much as they participate in a common
cause based on universal principles or those principles to which all
people might be loyal (see Royce, 1908). They then develop a loyalty
of a different type, one based on common values, not reciprocation.
Communication breakdowns are valued because they expose
differences in how the parties interpret these values. Ultimately,
relationships are based on internalized commonalities rather than
externalized expectations and agreement.
Corporations also are tenants of the people. They receive special
privileges in society by virtue of legislation approved by bodies elected
by the very people on whom the organizations depend for their
survival. Corporations should encourage discussion and debate
because they recognize, as every other human endeavor recognizes,
that they are not infallible. Like individuals, organizations are “capable
of rectifying mistakes, by discussion and experience” (Mill, 2002, p.
22). Corporations do not communicate with various groups to achieve
agreement. They communicate because they have something worth
saying, and they recognize that supporters and dissidents have
something worth saying, even if it is easily exposed as error. In other
words, organizations are open to opposing ideas because they are part
of a community of inquiry and care about other members of that
community. The organization’s purpose is finding truth, not achieving
what may be an artificial agreement.
It would be wrong to say that agreement is not desirable, but a
more realistic approach would be to seek agreement on general
principles. This allows for reasonable discussion and discourse between
disparate parties. John Rawls (1993) saw this ability to recognize the
value of differences among perceptions while sharing common beliefs
about justice in a free society as reasonable pluralism. “Once we
accept the fact that reasonable pluralism is a permanent condition of
public culture under free institutions, the idea of the reasonable is
more suitable as part of the basis of public justification” (Rawls, 1993,
p. 129, as cited in McCarthy, 1994, p. 60). Without a recognition of
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reasonable pluralism and a willingness to have one’s ideas widely
dispersed, powerful organizations may begin to “impose their beliefs
because, they say, their beliefs are true, and not because they are
their beliefs” (Rawls, 1993, p. 61; see also McCarthy, 1994, p. 60).
When people make the claim of truth based on their own beliefs and
then try to impose those beliefs on others, people are viewed as
unreasonable by an open society. Thus, reasonable citizens do not
impose their will on others but reconcile their beliefs with those of
others.
Organizations do not necessarily need to use symmetrical
communication to achieve a relationship with their stakeholders. They
recognize a plurality of beliefs and disseminate information as to their
beliefs, recognizing that others, even a minority, may differ. “If the
opinion is right, they are deprived of the opportunity of exchanging
error for truth: if wrong, they lose, what is almost as great a benefit,
the clearer perception and livelier impression of truth, produced by its
collision with error,” wrote Mill (2002, p. 19). With a greater focus on
identifying differences, public relations acts to reconcile disparate
opinions and facilitate the discovery of truth inside and outside the
organization. Suppressing an opposing opinion that contains truth may
cause the organization to hold opinions laced with prejudice and error
that lead it further and further away from the truth. Ultimately the
time will come in which “favorable circumstances” (p. 30) allow for the
truth to be known, and the people, “whose whole mental development
is cramped,” react with anger against the source of their deception
(pp. 34–35). Public relations should focus more on organizational
character and the discovery and dissemination of truth than it does on
dialogue. The field will find that by giving up some control over the
conversation, it will gain a greater voice in the conversation. The
public will begin to see practitioners as partners in the search for truth,
not as parents meddling in the meanings of their message offspring.

Conclusions
In this article, we show that public relations’ infatuation with
dialogue may create unrealistic expectations for organizational and
individual communication. Indeed, adherence to dialogic approaches,
such as the twoway symmetrical model, though well intended, may
actually cause public relations to slip into simple quid pro quo
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relationships. Peters’s (1999) analysis of communication approaches
advocated by Socrates and Jesus exposed the flaws of looking at twoway communication as most ethical and dissemination as the most
unethical. Dissemination can be just and dialogue unjust. More
important than the mode of communication is the morality of
communicators and their willingness to recognize and reconcile
differences. Finding truth becomes much more important than
achieving agreement, and change is motivated by a commitment to
character rather than a desire to manage reputation and consensus.
The goals of symmetrical communication or dialogic
communication are commendable but unreasonable. The common
ground sought by competing parties is not as important as the
common principles of truth, freedom, liberty, and human rights that
both espouse. Organizations should engage in communication because
they recognize the sovereignty of the individual, value liberty, and
seek truth. They disseminate ideas as a matter of conscience and
listen to public response as a matter of principle.
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